I, Afghanistanica, have joined a group blog titled Exploring the Heart of Asia. The blog is a new creation and consists of myself, long time Afghanistan blogger Safrang and the super Afghanistan femme blogger Home in Kabul. So that is where you will find all my blogging these days.

However, the amount of blogging at Exploring the Heart of Asia that I dedicate to conflict issues is going to be small. If you are looking for Afghanistan conflict/war/military-related issues I suggest these blogs:

• Registan
• Abu Muqawama
• [My] State Failure Blog
• Ghosts of Alexander

So please, visit Exploring the Heart of Asia and check out my new home.

Many people have contacted me and asked for suggestions for other Afghanistan blogs to read. There is a comprehensive list of Afghanistan-related blogs at:

 http://afghanistan-analyst.org/blogs.aspx

OK, this is definitely the last post ever.

March 11, 2008.

Did you know that blogging is time consuming? It really is. Especially when you need to cite sources to back up your arguments and find pictures to make your bog entries interesting.

So, since I’m now too busy to maintain this blog regularly, I’m ceasing to blog as of today. But I would not rule out seeing my stuff under a different name on certain group blogs elsewhere (but not a lot).

If you link to me, go ahead and remove Afghanistanica from your blogroll. Nobody likes inactive links.

Send any final mail to this address, I’ll check it for another few weeks or so:

March 7, 2008.

When you’re wrong, you’re wrong. Back in September I wrote about the firing of governor Murad of Kapisa, which the BBC wrote was in retaliation for his criticism of the central government. Apparently there is much more to the story and no journalists picked that up (in English at least). I should quit parroting journalists.

There is a lot about the inner workings of the Afghan government that never makes it out into the press. The full story on governor Murad is one of those things.

Read the original article with retraction here.

So technically speaking, I was wrong.

March 6, 2008.

All those Afghan communists were educated in the Soviet Union, right? Nope. Wrong answer. Actually, many of them were indoctrinated in the United States. Louis Dupree noted back in 1979 that, of the 14 civilians in the first Afghan communist government cabinet, exactly zero had been educated in the Soviet Union. Where were they educated? Here’s a breakdown:

• Egypt: 2
• Western Europe: 2
• Afghanistan: 4
• United States: 10

Martin Ewans wondered aloud whether the policies of these cabinet members would have been different if they “had the privilege of an education at Lumumba University in the USSR” (Source: Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics. 2001: 188)

Outside of the cabinet, in the highest office in the land we have, for a time, the enthusiastic communist Hafizullah Amin. Amin earned his MA at Columbia University, dropped out of a PhD program there and then later earned a spot on a list of “Columbia’s 10 worst Alumni.” His short reign of stupidity and brutality was put to an end by members of the KBG’s Alpha Group, who whacked him two days after Christmas 1979.

I tell you, the good old days of militant leftists marching on campus and waving the hammer and sickle is long gone. I only met one crazy leftist in my undergrad and MA phase, and that person was harmless. Of course, there are still crazy people on campus of various persuasions.

Anyways, back to my analysisizing. Communists who were educated in the Soviet Union were, after a certain date, given pragmatic views on how to develop a socialist paradise. The Afghan communists, deprived of that education, tried to create a paradise on some insane time scale, going against what the Soviets advised. The Soviets cautioned against repeating the mistakes they had made and cautioned that Afghanistan was not ready for many communist initiatives. The Afghan communists ignored this advice and went on the alienate/enrage as much of the country as they possibly could.

Pic: In Amin’s defense, he may have joined the communist party just for the parties. Sort of like joining a frat house.

You gotta love that American “can-do” spirit that was instilled into these Afghan communists.

The problem with graduates of American universities is that, from my experience, they are both some of the smartest and dumbest (sometimes at the same time) people you will ever meet. And more than a few of them have no real life experience and are ready to buy into some soon-to-fail spectacularly (or already failed) ideology of the left or right, or of elsewhere. And, fortunately and/or unfortunately, the graduates these days are generally more into apathy than ideology.

PhD students? The are, without a doubt, the finest embodiment of reason, logic, sage advice and wise leadership. ;)

March 3, 2008.

You may have heard that some small number of Afghans are worshipping at a cemetery in Kandahar where Arab Al Qaeda fighters are buried. Or not perhaps “worshipping” them, but asking them for some divine intervention for healing purposes. Check out this Al-Jazeera English news report:

This may seem like some sort of “victory in death” for the Arabs buried in this cemetery. But it is actually a defeat of their ideas. The Wahhabi strand of Islam that these particular Arab Muwahiddun adhered to would abhor the practises that these Afghans have brought to this cemetery. Wahhabism wants to purge Islam of shrines, saints, grave visits and any practise that is likely pre-Islamic or resulting from an fusion of Islam with local pagan practices.

Pic: For example, the Sufi Muslim shrine of Duzgunbaba in Turkey. It was formerly a “sacred place of the Hurrian/Hittite storm god Teshub” before the arrival of Islam.

You may recall anecdotes of Arab fighters actually destroying Afghan cemeteries because of the decorations and non-austere headstones. The locals responded with a vengeance. 

Local culture can often be a difficult thing to change. Especially if you want to replace it with some no-fun brand of Islam from Saudi Arabia.

February 29, 2008.

The issue of civilian casualties in Afghanistan is a highly contentious issue, and for good reason. In an opinion poll commissioned by the BBC, 29% of Afghans said the international troops were doing a bad job. The number one reason given (at 39%) was civilian casualties. The issue of bad intelligence has been discussed here, while the over-reliance on air power is frequently mentioned at Registan and Abu Muqawama. But that’s not what I’ll be discussing today.

What I’ll analyze today is the issue of compensation. But first some quantitative analysis: According to Human Rights Watch, in 2006 there were approximately 1200 civilian casualties in Afghanistan, of which as many as 300 could be blamed on international forces (and if the increased coverage of civilian casualties in the press accurately reflects what’s happening on the ground, I’m assuming 2007 will prove to be significantly higher).

Pic: Anger over the killing of Afghan civilians in March 2007.

The paper trail on US compensation for civilian casualties in Afghanistan is a little slim, amounting to only 17 claims that the ACLU obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (now allegedly available in this user-unfriendly database). But other incidents of compensation have been discussed in the media, such as the compensation payed out after Marines killed uninvolved bystanders after a suicide bomber attack in Jalalabad. Various amounts have been discussed, and I’ve usually heard figures in the $2000 dollar range. The ACLU report noted that payments for a life lost is capped at $2500.

Other payments are made as well. For example, since 2005 the US government has paid out about $40 million for property damage, personal injury and loss of life in Iraq. However, I couldn’t find any total for what is being paid out in Afghanistan. So what I’ll focus on is the compensation for loss of life and that $2500 figure. I’m not going to go searching for quotes, but I recall terms used for this level of compensation such as “arbitrary,” “shameful,” and various words to indicate that the commentator sees this compensation as grossly insufficient.

Pic: Karzai has angrily complained of civilian casualties numerous times (in Dari and Pashto).

A $2500 payment for the loss of a human life is many things, but surprisingly it may not be completely arbitrary. I don’t know how the Pentagon came up with this figure. It may indeed be arbitrary, but it is (at worst) actually about half of what was determined to be the value of a human life in the traditional Pashtun version of civil court (using a rather confusing economic comparison). To support this point, I’ll refer to Alef Shah Zadran’s 1977 PhD dissertation Socio-economic and legal-political processes in a Pashtun village, southeastern Afghanistan.

I became aware of this dissertation a while back while reading a working paper that said “Do Not Cite” on it. So I’ll work only from the sections that refer to Zadran’s dissertation. And yes, I know the problems of trying to apply one case study for a village in Paktia to all Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. But there are strong similarities between the various rural Pashtun areas. And indeed, the Pashtun tsali (practise) set amounts for the value of damages to body and for loss of life. Zadran (page 264) showed these tsali figures:

Bodily Injury Compensation Schedule in Afghanis: body part injured level of compensation. 1970’s: 1$=50 afghani.

• Right eye 7,500 afs
• Left eye 7,500 afs
• Right ear 5,000 afs
• Left ear 5,000 afs
• Nose 30,000 afs
• Middle incisor 5,000 afs
• Side incisor 5,000 afs
• Canine 2,500 afs
• Premolar 2,000 afs
• Molar 1,000 afs
• Hands 15,000 afs
• Right hand 10,000 afs
• Left hand 5,000 afs
• thumb 3,750 afs
• index finger 2,500 afs
• middle finger 2,000 afs
• ring 1,500 afs
• pinky 1,000 afs
• Feet 15,000 afs
• Right foot 7,500 afs
• Left foot 7,500 afs
• Amputation of foot 30,000 afs
• Fingernails or toenails (visible) 150 afs
• Fingernails or toenails (not visible) 100 afs

In the case of murder, a maraka (sort of an ad hoc but formalized arbitration court that fits within the Pashtunwali “code”) will be convened. In mid-1970’s currency, the blood-price (nake or khun) was set at $1200 (60,000 Afghanis). I stuck this in an inflation converter and came up with a figure of about $5000. But that’s using an American scale. I honestly have no idea of what 60,000 Afghanis ($1200) in rural eastern Afghanistan would be equivalent to today. But Zadran makes the point that this figure was still the standard in the 1970s, despite the perception by some that it was too low.

Pic: Probably no compensation for this.

In the case of murder, it was also common for the arbitration to include an unmarried girl to be given to the victims family in order to tie the families together and prevent future fighting (Jenna Bush to wed in Paktia Province?). But using American legal terms, we’re not talking murder in the vast majority of civilian casualty cases, we’re dealing with manslaughter or negligent homicide. And we’re talking about this in the context of war. Indeed, NATO has no rules in Afghanistan about compensation for civilian casualties, letting individual countries, such as Denmark, set their own rules.

As for the US, did they actually inquire in Afghanistan as to what would be the traditional level of compensation for loss of life and take that $1200/60,000 Afghanis figure as an approximate guide? Again I don’t know. But the point is that by traditional Afghan standards, it is at worst only half of what the level of compensation ideally is in rural Afghanistan. [Again I offer the caveat that taking a figure from 1970s Afghanistan and coming up with an amount for 2008 is a job for some sort of economist detective, which I'm not].

Personally, I think that the Pentagon should play it safe and go double the rate of that I came up with using the US inflation rate and make the compensation $10,000 rather than capping it at $2500. And yes, they should come up with a system of standards to govern the process. I recall a TV (or newspaper) report from Iraq that featured some beleaguered American officer inundated with locals demanding compensation for their imaginary livestock that the Americans has viciously massacred the previous week. If someone starts handing out compensation payments without doing much investigating, he will soon have a very long line of people forming outside his tent. And that applies whether the tent is located in Kansas City or Spin Boldak.

But at the moment there is that $2500 cap and the lack of clear guidelines. Or as Zalmay Khalilzad said in a different manner, American officers on the ground have “flexibility” in regards to compensation payments. And importantly, it seems that many incidents have occurred without compensation being granted. It does not seem that the quick delivery of compensation in wake of the US Marines killings of civilians in Jalalabad is the model for other incidents where US forces killed innocent bystanders (is this the “flexibility” that Khalilzad is referring to?).

Pic: A civilian killed by US Marines in Jalalabad.

The other issue is that of going beyond compensatory damages. In an American civil court damages are awarded as compensatory and punitive. The punitive damages are meant to punish the negligent/guilty party. This is where you see damages against large corporations going into the 100s of millions. Personally, I don’t support punitive damages against governments for incidences that occur during war (but I’m fine with compensatory damages).

Of course, it is not the issue of compensation that is the real problem here, it is the issue of the casualties themselves. Barnett Rubin’s quote reflects my position on the issue:

“What really hurts is the civilian casualties, at least when there are civilian casualties, there should be a mechanism for redressing those grievances. The civilian casualties and the apparent impunity of coalition and NATO forces — and also I should add, of private security contractors — is a big issue in the minds of Afghans. So if [compensation] can help address that, then that would [help] to some extent. But of course, it would be more important to eliminate civilian casualties.”

Some final extra, additional caveats: this blog entry is more to get people to think about the issue of compensation. I’m not offering my musings as a strong suggestion for determining compensation rates. That job should be left to some independent lawyer economist type who’s on the ground. And yes, I realize I used a rural case study and then showed pictures of the city of Jalalabad, that’s all I could find in the way of imagery.

February 26, 2008.

It’s the moment you may or may not have been anxiously waiting for: the release of the new up-to-date Afghanistan Bibliography. Download the pdf here:

http://afghanistan-analyst.org/Documents/AF2008.pdf

Here’s a sneak peak at the table of contents, minus the page numbers:

1. Ethnic Groups.

2. Conflict and Mobilization: War, Ethnicity, Jihad, Government, Factions, “Warlords,” Etc.

3. Islam, Political Islam, Jihad, Sects.

4. The International Community, Reconstruction, Security, Economy, Government, Conflict, and Development.

5. Opium cultivation, drug use and trafficking.

6. Environmental, Agriculture, Health and Natural Resources.

7. Human rights violations.

8. Women, Gender and Family.

9. Civil-Military Relations, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Counterinsurgency and Military Issues.

10. Refugees, Internal Displacement, Migration and Diaspora Issues.

11. Macro and Micro Economics.

12. Opinion Polls, Interviews, Study Groups and Surveys.

That’s it. Click here for the download.

February 10, 2008.

About 6 months ago, when few people read Afghanistanica, I wrote an entry titled Captain Zakharov: A COIN All-Star in Afghanistan. The blog entry gave an example of counter insurgency strategy that few thought the Soviets conducted in Afghanistan. Zakharov did everything that contemporary counterinsurgents are now being taught to do. Colonel Sergei Antonenko, however, serves up the stereotype of the brutal and unsuccessful counterinsurgent.

             Pic: Colonel Antonenko, growling for the camera.

My analysis of Zakharov and Antonenko are both based on Artyom Borovik’s book The Hidden War. If you are skeptical of an account by a Soviet journalist, just read what I wrote about Borovik in the account of Zakharov.

First I will introduce the man pictured above. Colonel Antonenko served in Afghanistan for two years, with his last assignment being a zone of responsibility on the southern approach to the Salang Pass (Ahmad Shah Massoud area of operations), an area that he “knew like the back of his own hand,” according to Borovik. An admirer in the military said that he was a officer that “the whole army should take after.”

Antonenko spoke of the mujahideen he was up against and had this to say:

“You could say that we’re best friends, but you can’t count on that. The East is a dark and cunning business. They say one thing, think another, and do something else entirely. [...]“

At the time Antonenko was interviewed, the war was winding down and withdrawal was imminent. Antonenko remarked:

“If you can guarantee that we can safely withdraw our troops through the Salang Tunnel, I told them, we won’t fortify the road. I even suggested that we sign a treaty: they would promise to guard the road from other rebel detachments and to let the columns of regular Afghan troops travel through, and we would refrain from combat. But they refused, saying that a Muslim’s spoken word is law. At any rate, we’ll have to see.”

Regarding his main opponent, Antonenko said:

“He’s a wise man, that Basir [Bashir], the local folks love him and respect him, of course. He always wears an American army jacket and dark sunglasses. He knows everything about the Soviet Union.”

At this point, we are given a view of Antonenko as a reasonable man with a healthy respect and skepticism of his enemy. But when Borovik interview other Soviet officers and enlisted men a different picture formed. The story of Antonenko’s falling out with Lieutenant Colonel Ushakov forms this view. After a Soviet operation the two became quite hostile to each other over their different views on tactics, namely the treatment of non-combatants. Antonenko seemed to have no problem killing them all to achieve his objective.

Ushakov’s approach was obviously quite different. Two APC gunners explained that they were under orders from Lieutenant Colonel Ushakov to fire only at mujahideen and not villagers. Adliukov, another officer under Ushakov, explained the falling out between the two. Antonenko paid a visit to Ushakov’s battalion and gave these simple orders to Adliukov regarding civilians who were in the way (certain types of mujahideen used non-combatants as cover regularly):

“Kill them all.”

Adliukov went on:

“During the fighting Antonenko personally shot several dozen civilians, even though he was responsible only for being in charge. Shooting at people with a submachine gun wasn’t part of his job.”

And then numerous witnesses backed up the story of when Antonenko gunned down a group of women, kids and old men who were walking down a road near where Soviet troops were gathering. This was too much even for a political officer, Captain Morozov, who was attached to the unit:

“…Captain Morosov, ran up to him, screaming ‘Comrade Colonel, Why the women and children?’ Antonenko apparently pushed him aside and snapped, ‘What about Urasov? Did they spare Urasov? Why should I spare them now?”

The earlier killing of Major Urasov by mujahideen using villagers as human shields (Urasov had ordered his men not to fire on the villagers who were being pushed in front of a group of mujahideen) seem to have pushed Antonenko to an entirely new level of disdain for civilians. They were now included in a monolithic group with the mujahideen. “They” meant every Afghan, combatant or not.

                  Pic by Mikhail Evstafiev: Soviet soldier, 1988.

Antonenko eventually confronted Ushakov over his refusal to follow orders:

“Why did you fail to comply with your orders? Why were the kishlaki [villages] barely damaged, not entirely destroyed, in the zone that your battalion was responsible for?”

Ushakov, a stutterer, gave a lengthy reply:

“[...] Yes it’s true that there was no butchery or unnecessary destruction in the zone that my battalion was responsible for. We fired only to the extent that it was called for. We didn’t erase a single kishlak [village] from the face of the earth; we saw n-n-no need for it. We were firing only at the spots where the band leaders were hiding and at the ammunition depots. [...]“

“[...] I tried to avoid unnecessary casualties among the civilian population. [...]“

                                 Pic: Lt. Col. Ushakov.

Antonenko was clearly unimpressed, as you can see by how he replied:

“I’m tired of talking to weak-minded imbeciles.”

Ushakov, then responded in a way that insured he would be formally “written up:”

“And I’m tired of having fools as my superiors.”

Ushakov was later warned by other officers that Antonenko had political connections and there was nothing hat could be done about him. But that did not stop Ushakov from registering complaints with four different political officers and superiors. Ushakov, clearly greatly frustrated, remarked to his friends:

“Antonenko is covered in blood up to his elbows. He won’t be able to get away with it. I w-w-will not allow it. He’s up for a decoration; they’re pushing him into the General Staff Academy. If people like him will be in charge, it would be better to have the whole army disbanded.”

         Pic by Mikhail Evstafiev: ANA troops pass Soviet troops.

The relationship continually worsened. Antonenko later showed up in Ushakov’s quarters with some friends, including a lady, laid down on Ushakov’s cot and ordered him to go make tea for him. Ushakov replied by accusing Antonenko of selling weapons to the mujahideen, a common occurrence in the Soviet-Afghan war.

After Ushakov left, Antonenko replied with possibly the worst defense he could think of. He invoked the court marshaled US Army Lieutentant William Calley of My Lai massacre infamy:

“You see, certain crazies, like this battalion commander [Ushakov], are trying to make me into a scapegoat - a kind of Soviet Lieutenant Calley. Calley is no criminal! In wartime you either kill or get killed. Those are the only alternatives.”

Borovik let these exchanges he observed speak for themselves, there was no need for commentary.

     Pic: Artyom Borovik, ten years and many pounds later.
                           

Antonenko then freely admitted to killing the civilians, using an incoherent list of justifications. Borovik then wrote:

“I looked deep into Antonenko’s eyes. He was sheltered securely beneath the invincible armor of good intentions.”

Antonenko then showed Borovik a portrait of his family, who Borovik described as “exceptionally beautiful.” Antonenko disappears from the narrative at this point. But the effect he made on his area of control put the final exclamation point on the Soviet-Afghan War.

As the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan Lt. Col. Ushakov, the last Soviet officer on the Salang Pass, told a soldier to stick the Soviet flag up his ass and then hinted to the Soviet political deputy who objected that he would mount his head on the armored personel carrier so that the Soviet journalists at the border could get a good look at him. So basically, it was an average day for the Soviet army. But then the troops passed through the village of Kalatak, where Antonenko had massacred the civilians.

One of the Soviet vehicles broke down as the troops passed through Kalatak. A soldier by the name of Igor Liakhovich left his armored personnel carrier to assist. He was shot at from a post near the road. A bullet entered his neck and exited the back of his head.

The Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was a very non-violent affair. The mujahideen generally kept their distance, not wanting to engage a retreating army. But here, in the village of Kalatak, a Soviet officer by the name of Colonel Sergei Antonenko had sown hatred. And so the last Soviet soldier to die in Afghanistan would be killed in Antoneko’s zone of responsibility.

Antonenko had two years in Afghanistan and this is what he had to show for his “efforts.”

                     Pic: The body of Igor Liakhovich

Further reading:

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Mongol Style

Captain Zakharov: A COIN All-Star in Afghanistan

January 30, 2008.

The Durand Line, for those of you not in the know, is the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Funnily enough, it seems to be moving westward. Kip, a new blogger over at Abu Muqawama, discusses the amazing mobile border:

Over the course of a decade, Pakistan has moved that border westward (also discussed by Ahmed Rashid as part of Pakistan’s pursuit of strategic depth). What defines the border now is no artificial Durand line but rather high ground and “key terrain,” all held, of course, by Pakistani forces. The response of Coalition countries has been to ignore this and tell the Afghan government to stop complaining about Pakistan and focus on its own problems. Tactically, however, this has made it even more difficult for the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Border Police, and Coalition Forces to prevent massive insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan.

Pic: The Durand Line is now somewhere on this map, moving around in a Manifest Destiny manner.

Of course, many Afghans are quite unhappy about this:

Moreover, the illegal seizure of Afghan territory (technically, by the way, an act of war) prevents more effective cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani forces as the premise for discussing cooperation from the Pakistani side rests on the border “as is” rather than “as it is marked on the map.” No good Afghan officer is going to cede Afghanistan’s territory to promote better communication, a fence here or there, and perhaps a little combined patrolling.

What does this mean for counterinsurgency efforts?

Pakistan’s illegal seizure of Afghan land ensures ease-of-access from Pakistan-based, militant safe havens. This ensures a near-continuous supply of foreign and Pashtun fighters from the madrassas and both tribal and Al Qaeda networks to fuel the insurgency and kill Americans. Congress got upset enough about Musharraf’s anti-democracy crackdown that they almost, sort-of threatened to withhold money from Pakistan. Perhaps the next time we are going to give Musharraf untold amounts of money to spend on building defenses against India in support of anti-terrorism efforts, would it be too much to ask for our Pakistani “allies” to move to their side of the border in order to get access to some of that money?

“Kip,” a US Army officer who has served extensively in Afghanistan, writes about this issue within the broader context. Read the whole post here.

So the big bully Pakistan is taking land from poor, peace-loving Afghanistan? Well, sort of. It’s complicated. What’s worth mentioning is that the are more than a few Pashtun nationalists in Afghanistan who hope for a united Pashtunistan, if they can just take all that Pashtun land from Pakistan.

Pic: This is Pashtunistan. I hope the Baluchis, Nuristanis, Pashai and Dardic people do not see this.

One of the things that Pakistan wants is for Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line. Afghanistan has, throughout history, refused to do so. This habit has continued into the Karzai administration. So you can see why Pakistan, which is under some debatable threat of state failure and disintegration, is so sensitive about the issue. And more than a few non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan are not to psyched about the prospect of being in a state with 11 million additional Pashtuns. In fact, the newly formed United National Front (not just another lame-o new political party) has called for official recognition of the border. (The party does have Pashtun members though). More on that party here.

Pic: The United National Front, as caricatured by Matt Weems. The guy holding the handle bars is Rabbani, Qanuni is above him, Dostum is on the top left reaching his hand out to smack someone (or high-five), bottom right is Ismael Khan, above him is Gulabzoy (rocking the Commie hat) and the late Mustafa Kazemi (who was killed in the Baghlan suicide bombing) is on the bottom left.

Anyways, I promise to fully analyze the Pashtunistan/Durand Line issue at some time in the future instead of just stealing stuff from Abu Muqawama.